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Online auctions have expanded rapidly over the last decade and have become a fascinating new type of
business or commercial transaction in this digital era. Here we introduce a master equation for the bidding
process that takes place in online auctions. We find that the number of distinct bidders who bid k times, called
the k-frequent bidder, up to the t-th bidding progresses as nk(t)∼ tk−2.4. The successfully transmitted bidding
rate by the k-frequent bidder is obtained as qk(t)∼ k−1.4, independent of t for large t. This theoretical prediction
is in agreement with empirical data. These results imply that bidding at the last moment is a rational and effective
strategy to win in an eBay auction.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.75.Da, 89.65.-s, 89.65.Gh
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) refers to any type of
business or commercial transaction that involves information
transfer across the Internet. As a formation of e-commerce,
the online auction, i.e., the auction via the Internet [1], has
expanded rapidly over the last decade and has become a fas-
cinating new type of business or commercial transaction in
this digital era. Online auction technology has several bene-
fits compared with traditional auctions. Traditional auctions
require the simultaneous participation of all bidders or agents
at the same location; these limitations do not exist in online
auction systems. Owing to this convenience, “eBay.com,” the
largest online auction site, boasts over 40 million registered
consumers and has experienced rapid revenue growth in re-
cent years.
Interestingly, the activities arising in online auctions gen-
erated by individual agents proceed in a self-organized man-
ner [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. For example, the total number of bids
placed in a single item or category and the bid frequency
submitted by each agent follow power-law distributions [8].
These power-law behaviors [9, 10, 11] are rooted in the fact
that an agent who makes frequent bids up to a certain time is
more likely to bid in the next time interval. This pattern is
theoretically analogous to the process that is often referred to
as preferential attachment, which is responsible for the emer-
gence of scaling in complex networks [12]. This is reminis-
cent of the mechanism of generating the Zipf law [10, 13].
The accumulated data of a detailed bidding process enable us
to quantitatively characterize the dynamic process. In this pa-
per, we describe a master equation for the bidding process.
The master-equation approach is useful to capture the dynam-
ics of the online bidding process because it takes into account
of the effect of openness and the non-equilibrium nature of the
auction. This model is in contrast to the existing equilibrium
approach [14, 15] in which there is a fixed number of bidders.
The equilibrium approach is relevant to traditional auctions;
however, it is unrealistic to apply this approach to Internet
auctions. The power-law behavior of the bidding frequency
submitted by individual agents can be reproduced from the
master equation. Moreover, we consider the probability of
an agent who has bidden k times, called the k-frequent bid-
der, becoming the final winner. We conclude that the winner
is likely to be the one who bids at the last moment but who
placed infrequent bids in the past.
Our study is based on empirical data collected from two dif-
ferent sources [8]. The first dataset was downloaded from the
web, http://www.eBay.com, and is composed of all the auc-
tions that closed in a single day. The data include 264,073
auctioned items, grouped into 194 subcategories. The dataset
allows us to identify 384,058 distinct agents via their unique
user IDs. To verify the validity of our findings in different
markets and time spans, the second dataset was accumulated
over a period of one year from eBay’s Korean partner, auc-
tion.co.kr. The dataset comprised 215,852 agents that bid on
287,018 articles in 355 lowest categories.
An auction is a public sale in which property or items of
merchandise are sold to the bidder who proposes the high-
est price. Typically, most online auction companies adopt the
approach of English auction, in which an article or item is ini-
tially offered at a low price that is progressively raised until
a transaction is made. Both “eBay.com” and “auction.co.kr”
adopt this rule and many bidders submit multiple bids in the
course of the auction. An agent is not allowed to place two
or more bids in direct succession. It is important to notice
that the eBay auction has a fixed end time: It typically ends
a week after the auction begins, at the same time of day to
the second. The winner is the latest agent to bid within this
period. In such an auction that has a fixed deadline, bidding
that takes place very close to the deadline does not give other
bidders sufficient time to respond. In this case, a sniper–the
last moment bidder–might win the auction, while the bid that
follows has a substantial probability of not being transmitted
successfully. While such a bidding pattern is well known em-
pirically, no quantitative analysis has been performed on it as
yet. In this study we analyze this issue through the rate equa-
tion approach.
To characterize the dynamic process, we first introduce sev-
eral quantities for each item or article as follows:
(i) When a bid is successfully transmitted, time t increases
by one.
(ii) Terminal time T is the time at which an auction ends.
Thus, the index of bids runs from i = 1 to T .
(iii) N(t) is the number of distinct bidders who successfully
bid at least once up to time t. Thus, the index of bidders
(or agent) runs from i = 1 to N(t).
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FIG. 1: Plot of T versus N(T ) for the eBay.com (a) and the Korean
auction (b). The dotted line has a slope of 1 both in (a) and 4.5 in (b).
(iv) ki(t) is the number of successful bids transmitted by an
agent i up to time t.
(v) nk(t) is the number of bidders with frequency k up to
time t.
From the above, we obtain the relations
N(t) = ∑
k
nk(t) (1)
and
t = ∑
k
knk(t) (2)
for any time t including the terminal time T .
It is numerically found that T is linearly proportional to
N(T ), that is, T ∝ N(T ). The average value of the propor-
tional coefficient a for different items or articles listed in eBay
is estimated to be a ≈ 1 when the total number of bidders
N(T ) exceeds 20. However, when the number of bidders is
lower, the proportional coefficient is very large, as shown in
Fig. 1. For the Korean auction, a≈ 4.5, regardless of the num-
ber of bidders. On the other hand, the bidding frequencies
and the number of bidders for each article are not uniform.
Their distributions, denoted as Pf (T ) and Pn(N), respectively,
follow the exponential functions Pf (T ) ∼ exp(−T/Tc) and
Pn(N) ∼ exp(−N/Nc), respectively, where Tc ≈ 7.4 and 10.8
for the eBay and Korean auctions, respectively, and Nc ≈ 2.5
and 5.6 for the eBay and Korean auction, respectively (Fig.2).
We introduce the master equation for the bidding process
as
nk(t +1)−nk(t) = wk−1(t)nk−1(t)−wk(t)nk(t)+δk,1ut , (3)
where wk(t) is the transition probability that a bidder, who has
bid k−1 times up to time t−2, bids at time t. In this case, the
total bid frequency of that agent up to time t becomes k. Note
that a bidder is not allowed to bid successively. In the master
equation, we presume that the bidding pattern is similar over
different items when N(T ) is sufficiently large. Then, wk(t)
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FIG. 2: Plot of Pf (T ) versus T in (a) and (c), and Pn(N) versus N in
(b) and (d) for the eBay (a) and (b) and Korean auction (c) and (d)
in semi-logarithmic scale. The dotted lines have slopes of 2.5 in (a),
5.6 in (b), 7.4 in (c), and 10.8 in (d).
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FIG. 3: Plot of 〈dk/dt〉 versus k/t for the eBay (a) and for the Korean
auction (b). The dotted lines obtained by the least square fit in the
range [0.1:1] (a) and [0.01:1] (b), respectively, fit to the formula,
≈ 0.7k/t.
may be written as wk(t) ≈ 〈dk/dt〉 on average over different
items. Empirically, we find that
wk(t)≈ 〈dk/dt〉 ≈ bk/t, (4)
where b is estimated to be b ≈ 0.7 for both the eBay and Ko-
rean auctions (Fig. 3). The fact that wk ∝ k is reminiscent of
the preferential attachment rule in the growing model of the
complex network [12]. ut is the probability that a new bidder
makes a bid at time t. Using the property that ∑k nk(t) = N(t),
we obtain
ut = N(t + 1)−N(t). (5)
Next we then change the discrete equation, Eq. (3), to a
continuous equation as follows:
∂nk(t)
∂ t =−
∂
∂k
(
wk(t)nk(t)
)
+ δk,1ut , (6)
which can be rewritten as
∂nk(t)
∂ t =−
b
t
∂
∂k
(
knk(t)
)
+ δk,1ut . (7)
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FIG. 4: Plot of 〈N(t)〉 versus t, on average over different items for
the eBay data. The straight line has a slope of 0.7 obtained from the
least square fit.
When k > 1, we use the method of separation of variables,
nk(t) = I(k)T (t), thus obtaining
∂
∂k (kI(k))+ ℓI(k) = 0, (8)
where ℓ is a constant of separation, and
∂T (t)
∂ t =
bℓ
t
T (t). (9)
Thus, we obtain
nk(t)∼ t
bℓk−(1+ℓ). (10)
When k = 1,
∂n1(t)
∂ t =−
b
t
n1(t)+ ut . (11)
Next from the fact that N = ∑k nk, we obtain
∂N
∂ t = ∑k>1
∂nk
∂ t +
∂n1
∂ t
= ∑
k>1
−
b
t
∂
∂k
(
knk
)
−
b
t
n1 +
∂N
∂ t
=
bℓ
t
(N− n1)−
b
t
n1 +
∂N
∂ t .
Therefore, we obtain N(t) = (1+1/ℓ)n1(t) and n1(t)∼ tbℓ by
using Eq. (11). Note that N(t) < t, and the linear relationship
holds asymptotically. The linear relationship breaks down for
small t. From the empirical data, Fig. 4, we find that ℓb ≈ 1.
Since b ≈ 0.7 in Fig. 3, we obtain ℓ≈ 1/b≈ 1.4. Therefore,
nk(t)∼ tk−2.4 (12)
for large t, which fits reasonably with the numerical data
shown in Fig.5.
In eBay auctions, the winner is the last bidder in the bidding
sequence. Now, we trace the bidding activity of the winner in
the bidding sequence in order to find the winning strategy. To
proceed, let me define qk(t + 1) as the probability that a bid-
der, who has bid k−1 times up to time t−1, bids at time t+1
successfully. Note that a bidder is not allowed to bid succes-
sively. In this case, qk(T ) is nothing but the probability that
a k-frequent bidder becomes the final winner. The probability
qk(t + 1) satisfies the relation,
qk(t + 1) = (1− ut+1)
N(t)
∑
j=1
q j(t)
(k− 1)(nk−1(t)− δ j,k−1)
t− j
+ δk,1ut+1 (13)
with the boundary conditions q1(1) = 1 and q1(2) = 1. The
first term on the right hand side of Eq. (13) is composed of
three factors: (i) 1− ut+1 is the probability that one of the ex-
isting bidders bids successfully at time t + 1, (ii) q j(t) means
that bidding at time t is carried out by the j-frequent bidder,
and (iii) the last factor is derived from the bidding rate, Eq. (4),
where the contribution by the bidder at time t is excluded be-
cause he/she is not allowed to bid at time t + 1. The second
term represents the addition of a new bidder at time t.
The rate equation, Eq. (13), can be solved recursively. To
proceed, we simplify Eq. (13) by assuming that nk−1(t) is sig-
nificantly larger than δ j,k−1, which is relevant when the num-
ber of bidders is large. Then,
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FIG. 5: Plot of nk versus k for the eBay auction at ebay.com (a) and
for the Korean auction at auction.co.kr (b) for various terminal times
T . The solid lines have a slope of -2.4 drawn for guidance.
4qk(t + 1) ≈ (1− ut+1)
N(t)
∑
i=1
qi(t)
(k− 1)nk−1(t)
t− i
+ δk,1ut+1
= (k− 1)nk−1(t)
t
∏
τ=2
(1− uτ+1)
[ τ−1
∑
i=1
(i− 1)ni−1(τ)
(τ − i)
]
q1(2) (14)
+ (1− ut+1)(k− 1)nk−1(t)
t
∑
τ=3
uτ
τ − 1
t
∏
τ ′=τ+1
(1− uτ ′)
[ τ ′−1
∑
i=1
(i− 1)ni−1(τ ′)
(τ ′− i)
]
+ ut+1δk,1.
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FIG. 6: Plot of the relative winning probability qk(T )/q1(T ) of the k-
frequent bidder to that of the one-frequent bidder at the last moment
versus frequency k. The dotted line has a slope of -1.4 drawn for
guidance.
Since 1− ut ≈ 0.3 < 1, qk(t) is obtained to be
qk(t)≈ (1− ut−1)
(k− 1)nk−1(t− 1)
t− 2
+ δk,1ut (15)
within the leading order. Considering that nk(t) ∼ tk−2.4 in
Eq. (12) and ut is constant, we obtain qk(t)∼ (t−1)k−1.4/(t−
2) for large k and t, with a weak dependence on t. Thus, the
winning probability by the k-frequent bidder is simply given
as
qk(T )∼ k−1.4 (16)
in the limit t → ∞. This result is confirmed by the empirical
data in Fig. 6.
Our analysis explicitly shows that the winning strategy is to
bid at the last moment as the first attempt rather than incre-
mental bidding from the start. This result is consistent with
the empirical finding by Roth and Ockenfels [16] in eBay.
According to them, the bidders who have won the most items
tend to wait till the last minute to submit bids, albeit there is
some probability of bids not being successfully transmitted.
As evidence, they studied 240 eBay auctions and found that
89 bids were submitted in the last minute and 29 in the last
ten seconds. Our result supports these empirical results.
In conclusion, we have analyzed the statistical properties
of emerging patterns created by a large number of agents
based on the empirical data collected from eBay.com and
auction.co.kr. The number of bidders and the winning proba-
bility decay in power laws as nk(t)∼ tk−2.4 and qk(t)∼ k−1.4,
respectively, with bid frequency k, which has been confirmed
by empirical data.
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